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Abstract: This paper studies the relation between board size and composition 
and cost savings (scope economies) from combining savings mobilisation  
and lending by Microfinance Institutions (MFIs). The findings support  
the hypothesis that employee representation on the board is associated with 
positive scope economies, possibly due to internal knowledge. However,  
CEO-Chairman duality is associated with equal or larger probability of scope 
diseconomies, which is consistent with previous findings. Representation  
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of other stakeholders on the MFI board does not affect scope economies.  
The results seem to support the notion that, in highly uncertain environments, 
group cohesion may be an advantageous mechanism of control. 
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1 Introduction 
The literature on the role of governance in microfinance is relatively recent and much 
remains to be learned about what constitutes good governance in MFIs. Research on the 
impact of internal and external governance mechanisms on MFIs’ performance has 
identified mechanisms that could promote better performance (Labie, 2001; Hartarska, 
2005; Mersland and Strøm, 2009). Recently, Hartarska and Mersland (2012) studied the 
impact of governance mechanisms on outreach efficiency, incorporating both cost 
minimisation and outreach goals of MFIs. This paper uses a related approach and follows 
up on the argument made by Berger and Humphrey (1997) that efficiency estimates in 
financial institutions are affected by the management which, in turn, is affected  
by governance mechanisms. Thus, we study the link between existing governance 
mechanisms and scope economies (managerial efficiency) in MFIs. 
The existence of scope economies is well documented in the banking literature.  
Scope economies are efficiency gains that exist when it is cheaper to produce deposit 
mobilisation and lending by one firm (a bank) rather than by two separate banks each 
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producing only one output – only deposits or only loans. Recent microfinance studies 
develop new methods to estimate scope economies and show that, while most MFIs 
(would) have scope economies, some (could) experience significant scope diseconomies 
(Hartarska et al., 2011). Research also shows that geography, demography, economic 
conditions, and MFI-specific characteristics affect the magnitudes of the scope 
(dis)economies (Hartarska et al., 2010). Since scope economies result from managerial 
efficiency and thus governance structures and, since these links have not been studied  
so far, we set to determine how internal governance mechanisms and, in particular, board 
size and composition, are associated with (dis)economies of scope from jointly collecting 
savings and extending loans. 
Following the literature on managerial efficiency, we first estimate scope economies 
from a cross-country sample by deploying a Semiparametric Smooth Coefficient (SPSC) 
model and then link these estimates to MFI governance structure. The SPSC model 
accommodates two important characteristics of the microfinance industry. First, we are 
able to address a major concern for similar cross-country microfinance studies – the need 
to control for direct and indirect impact of the external environment in which MFIs 
operate (Armedariz and Szafarz, 2011; Ahlin et al., 2011). This is important because 
previous papers have found that estimated scope economies with environmental variables 
are preferable to estimates without them (Hartarska et al., 2010, 2011). By controlling for 
environmental factors in the first stage (in the cost function directly, and by interacting 
environmental factors with input prices), we avoid misattributing (in)efficiency due to 
external factors to variations in the governance structure. Moreover, since it permits zero 
output values, our method allows using data from all institutions including lending-only 
institutions that represent the majority of MFIs. 
Next, we look at differences in board size and composition between MFIs with scope 
economies and scope diseconomies to find out how they differ across various MFIs.  
In this second stage, we use simple mean differences comparison across groups with 
estimated scope economies and diseconomies and a panel probit model to study if there 
are differences in governance characteristics that affect the probability of an MFI having 
scope (dis)economies. We further estimate the impact of various governance mechanisms 
directly on the magnitudes of scope economies using random effects regressions to 
address possible differential effect of board composition identified in the literature 
(Konrad et al., 2008). Finally, we identify the differences in board size and composition 
between MFIs actually providing savings and deposits and lending-only MFIs using 
differences in means because, for some characteristics, the number of observations is not 
sufficient to estimate separate group regressions. 
We find some support for the hypothesis that the use of internal information via 
employee representation on MFI boards may increase the scope economies. However, 
CEO-Chairperson duality is associated with a slightly larger probability of negative scope 
economies, consistent with previous work in microfinance (Hartarska and Mersland, 
2012; Galema et al., 2012). The representation by other types of stakeholders such as 
clients, international directors and creditors, as well as gender and international diversity 
of board members, are not associated with higher scope economies. These results seem  
to support the notion that, in high uncertainty environments, group cohesion may be an 
advantageous mechanism of control, which is consistent with ideas proposed by 
Eisenhardt et al. (1997) and Kanter (1977). 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the related, 
mainly empirical, literature and lays out the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes 
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the empirical methodology and Section 4 summarises the data. The results are discussed 
in Section 5, while the last section offers conclusions. 
2 Literature review 
2.1 The role of the board in the literature on MFI performance and governance 
Few empirical studies evaluate the impact of governance mechanisms and board size  
and composition in particular on MFIs’ performance. The first empirical study on 
microfinance by Hartarska (2005) uses survey data from MFIs in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia (ECA) to study how managerial compensation, board size and composition 
(stakeholder representation, gender, and skills), as well as external factors such as 
prudential regulations, external rating, and auditing affect financial performance and 
outreach. She finds that some traditional control mechanisms, such as performance-based 
compensation, are ineffective, while others, such as board independence, improve 
performance. This work highlights the importance of performance measures which may 
capture different dimension of MFIs’ objectives. For example, boards with a higher 
proportion of donors were found to have lower sustainability but reach poorer borrowers, 
while MFIs with client representation have better sustainability but serve fewer poor 
clients. This paper does not find consistent evidence that board size (as well as regulation, 
audits, or ratings) affects MFI outreach or sustainability. 
Mersland and Strøm (2009) use a larger sample of rated MFIs and study whether the 
CEO-Chairperson duality, female CEOs, international directors, board size, and external 
factors affect financial performance and outreach. These authors find no evidence that 
typical governance mechanisms work, but their results may also be affected by using 
measures of different aspects of performance. For example, this work finds that MFIs 
with female CEOs have better ROA, that MFIs with dual CEO-Chairperson positions 
have a higher portfolio yield and serve more clients but show no other measurable 
performance difference, that MFIs with larger boards distribute smaller loans, and that 
external factors play a limited role at best. 
Closest to the present work is the study of Hartarska and Mersland (2012) who 
investigate the impact of governance on technical efficiency. They find that MFIs in 
which the positions of the CEO and board chair are merged are less efficient and, 
similarly, that MFIs with a larger proportion of insiders on the board are less efficient. 
They also find that managerial efficiency increases with board size up to nine members 
and decreases after that, and that donors’ representation on the board is not beneficial, 
while that of creditors may improve efficiency, although very few MFIs in the sample 
had creditors as directors. These findings are interpreted to mean that most MFIs have 
already organised their internal governance structures to be relatively successful. 
2.2 Board size and composition as an internal governance mechanism 
The microfinance board is a major internal governance mechanism. In a typical MFI, 
board members are not paid, but their incentives are aligned with those of stakeholders, 
because members are legally responsible for effective monitoring. Such board  
members offer their reputation as collateral and will try to minimise the risk of damage  
to it (Handy, 1995). Board members do not collude with managers and are effective 
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supervisors due to reputational concerns and peer pressure (Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 
1983b).1 In practice, MFIs want to identify board members who are able and willing to 
dedicate the time needed to effectively monitor management (Labie, 2001). Since MFI 
managers strive to achieve outreach and sustainability, they reveal more information to 
their boards than what would have been revealed under a single profit maximisation 
objective (Hartarska, 2002). Thus, the board plays an important role in an MFI, and it is 
important to study how scope economies achievable by the MFI are associated with 
variations in board size and composition.  
A significant part of the empirical literature has focused on the impact of board size 
on firm performance. Since free-riding is more likely in larger boards, there is evidence 
that larger boards are less effective in corporations as well as in small firms (Yermack, 
1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998). Financial intermediaries usually have larger boards than do 
non-financial firms, but the empirical evidence shows both a positive and negative 
relation between board size and performance (Adams and Mehran, 2003; Pathan et al., 
2008). Studies on non-profits boards have suggested that larger boards may be more 
successful because of the additional duties that board members take on in supervising 
fundraising, but there is no empirical support for this claim (Oster and O’Reagan, 2004). 
Cheng (2008) finds evidence that larger corporate boards are associated with less 
variability in firm performance, because larger boards take longer to reach consensus and 
their decisions are less extreme. The importance of communicating stability to customers 
in an MFI would suggest that there may be benefits to a larger size. Yet, thus far, the 
empirical evidence is mixed. Hartarska (2005) did not find consistent evidence of a 
positive impact of larger boards on ROA, or on the number of actual borrowers, while 
Mersland and Strøm (2009) found weak evidence that MFIs with larger boards offer 
smaller-sized loans, suggesting targeting of poorer clients. Hartarska and Mersland 
(2012) found a non-linear relationship with an optimal size of about nine members.  
Since the association between board size and scope economies of the MFIs has not been 
explored, we propose  
Hypothesis 1: Board size has a non-linear impact on the probability of an MFI 
possessing positive scope economies. 
Board composition reflects a board’s quality and its ability to monitor and advise  
the manager (Boone et al., 2007). Several aspects of board composition are usually 
considered in the literature, and the impacts of independent directors (those without 
stakes in the firm) as well as separate CEO and Board Chair roles are the most  
studied (Bhagat and Jefferie, 2002).2 Empirical evidence supports both a positive and a 
negative relation between the proportion of outside directors and firm performance 
(Mayers et al., 1997; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997). The explanation in the literature is 
that when a firm operates in a noisy environment, board monitoring costs are higher  
and there will be less monitoring. Allen and Gale (2000) also show that the board’s 
monitoring is often ineffective in environments of high uncertainty with less divergence 
between the CEO and owners objectives, when the firm’s financing is out of retained 
earnings and owners may find it advantageous to yield control to the CEO. 
The empirical findings from high-growth firms show that they have smaller  
boards with a high proportion of insiders, since outside directors are less effective  
(Coles et al., 2008). Firms facing greater information asymmetry will have less 
independent boards because of the higher cost of monitoring (Linck et al., 2008). 
However, the expected benefits of an inside director’s expert knowledge outweigh the 
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expected costs of managerial entrenchment when managerial and outside shareholder 
interests are closely aligned (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997). Banks typically have a larger 
proportion of outside directors, and empirical work finds that the proportion of 
independent directors has a positive impact on performance in some banks (Adams and 
Mehran, 2003; Pathan et al., 2008). 
For a sample of MFIs in the ECA region, Hartarska (2005) finds that MFIs with a 
larger proportion of independent directors achieve better outreach, but board size had no 
effect on financial results. Hartarska and Mersland (2012) find that outreach efficiency is 
inversely related to the proportion of insiders measured by proportion of employees. 
Since scope economies are likely to be affected by insiders’ knowledge, namely the 
ability to understand both savers’ and borrowers’ incentives and preferences, it is 
important to study whether the presence of insiders on the board will affect scope 
economies. Therefore, we form  
Hypothesis 2: The proportion of insiders on the board, measured as the proportion of 
employees on the board, affects scope economies. 
In some MFIs, the CEO is also the chairman of the board, in spite of previous calls to 
split the role. For example, Otero and Chu (2002) attribute the collapse of Corposol/ 
Finansol in Colombia to a lack of proper board independence and to poor oversight,  
both of which allowed too much power to be concentrated in the hands of one executive. 
Duality of CEO and board Chairperson may be a sign of CEO entrenchment, since the 
CEO may pursue policies that allow him private benefits (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1998). Mersland and Strøm (2009) found that in MFIs, the CEO-Chairperson duality had 
a positive impact on portfolio yields and on the number of clients served. It did not, 
however, influence overall financial performance measures. Hartarska and Mershland 
(2012), however, found that duality is associated with less efficient outreach, while 
Galema et al. (2012) report that duality in not for profit MFIs leads to weaker and more 
variable financial results.  
Hypothesis 3: MFIs in which the positions of CEO and board Chairperson are split 
perform better than those in which the position is not split. 
Other stakeholders also matter. For example, the presence of creditors on the board 
improves the value and performance of German firms, perhaps by reducing agency costs 
(Gorton and Schmidt, 2000). Unlike most other boards, the MFI board may also include 
representatives of social investors (when the organisation has raised funds in the external 
markets) such as donors as well as clients. These groups of stakeholders may play a role 
similar to that of large blocks of stakeholders and may improve efficiency. The interests  
of each group may not coincide with the interest of the other two groups. For example, 
investors may prefer better returns, while donors and clients may prefer outreach, as 
suggested in Hartarska (2005). However, Mersland and Strøm (2009) do not find that 
these stakeholder groups influence performance, while Hartarska and Mersland (2012) 
find that creditors may improve outreach efficiency. Therefore, we hypothesise that  
Hypotheses 4–6: The proportions of each group of creditors, clients, and donors on 
the board affect scope economies. 
Board diversity is another aspect of governance that has attracted attention.  
MFIs often target female customers (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). A female CEO 
may be better at obtaining information from predominantly female customers compared 
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to a male CEO, and this could affect scope economies.3 Representation by international 
directors is also of interest because it is common (in about fifth of the MFIs) and because 
some evidence suggests that corporate performance may improve with the presence of 
international directors (e.g., Oxelheim and Randøy, 2003). Moreover, Hartarska (2005) 
finds positive association between women on the board and performance for MFIs in 
ECA, and Mersland and Strom (2009) find that MFI financial performance is positively 
associated with female CEOs. 
Some empirical evidence from corporate boards suggests that board diversity may 
improve shareholder wealth maximisation (Brancato and Patterson, 1999; Westphal and 
Milton, 2000; Carter et al., 2003). For non-profits, evidence shows that women directors 
spend more time on monitoring activities but better performing organisations do not have 
proportionally more women and minorities on the boards (Oster and O’Reagan, 2004). 
Organisational scholars have pointed out, however, that diverse teams may disagree 
more, and the same may be true for MFI boards. Thus, to improve board effectiveness,  
it may not be enough to simply increase the number of female directors but it may  
also require additional mechanisms to ensure cooperation between directors (Eisenhardt 
et al., 1997). Kanter (1977) suggests that when uncertainty regarding the outcome of 
managerial effort is high, explicit pay-performance contracts are too costly and group 
homogeneity is more valuable. There is some empirical evidence that firms facing  
more variability in their stock returns have fewer women on their boards of directors 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Dutta and Bose (2006) also find inconsistent results 
regarding the relation between women representation on the board and banks’ 
performance in Bangladesh. 
MFIs serve high-risk clients and face high uncertainty. Moreover, their managers 
usually do not receive performance-based compensation. It is unknown, however,  
if board homogeneity may lead to better governance through better cooperation between 
similar board members. Thus, while board diversity may be desirable from the equity 
point of view, it is still unknown if in MFIs it is effective given the high level of 
uncertainty that exists in organisations with multiple objectives. In microfinance, we are 
interested in two aspects of diversity – representation of women and of international 
directors. Thus we test  
Hypothesis 7: Scope economies are affected by the board’s diversity. 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Estimation of economies of scope 
Scope economies allow the determination of the optimal product mix both within and 
across a sample of firms. Scope economies were defined by Pulley and Humphrey (1993) 
as the percentage of cost savings from producing all outputs jointly as opposed  
to producing each output separately. In the empirical setting discussed here, only two 
outputs exist, q1 and q2, the $ value of loans and deposits, respectively. Thus, scope 
economies are constructed as: 
1 2 1 2
1 2
( , 0; ) (0, ; ) ( , ; )
( , ; )
C q r C q r C q q rSCOPE
C q q r
+ −
=  (1) 
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where C(·) is the cost function, q1 and q2 are outputs and r is a vector of input prices. 
Given that the data used to estimate the cost function of MFIs represent a mix of MFIs 
exclusively offering loans and those that produce loans and deposits jointly, the use of 
standard cost functions in production econometrics is not suitable, e.g., translog  
(see Pulley and Braunstein, 1992; Hartarska et al., 2011). 
Pulley and Braunstein (1992) proposed a cost function capable of admitting data  
from firms that may possess zero-valued outputs without requiring ad hoc data 
transformations. Their cost function was a modification of the multiplicatively separable 
cost function of Baumol et al. (1982). This cost function is quadratic (as opposed to 
traditional log-quadratic cost functions) in outputs. The importance of having outputs 
enter quadratically instead of log quadratically is the alleviation of the confusion 
surrounding the appropriate way to include firms with zero valued data when logarithmic 
transformations are desired. The composite cost model of Pulley and Braunstein (1992)  
is written succinctly as:  
( , ln ) ( , ln ) (ln ) .C q r F q r G r u= − × +  (2) 






exp ln ln ln
i i ij i j ik i k
k k k k l i
C a a q a q q g q r
b b r b r r ε
 
= + + +  
× + + +
∑ ∑∑ ∑∑
∑ ∑∑  (3) 
where qi represents output i, ri is the price of input i, and a, b and g are parameters  
to be estimated. Equation (3) can be estimated using standard parametric econometric 
techniques such as nonlinear least squares or maximum likelihood after an appropriate 
distributional assumption. However, we argue next that a priori specification of G( ) is 
not required. In the current setup G( ) is assumed to be exponential. The composite cost 
function in equation (2) falls in the more general class of models known as smooth 
coefficient models. More importantly, by dispensing with a parametric assumption for 
G( ), we can develop a SPSC model, affording even more generality to our setting than 
just a simple parametrically specified smooth coefficient model. The SPSC models  
have a tractable, closed form solution, eschew unnecessary parametric specification of 
the scaling component of the cost function and, for a fixed set of input prices, can be 
interpreted as a parametric cost function. Given the generality of this approach and our 
desire to mitigate functional form assumptions on the estimated scope economies which 
is our target of interest, we adopt this flexible semiparametric modelling strategy.  
3.2 A Semiparametric Smooth Coefficient cost function 
The empirical cost function proposed by Pulley and Braunstein (1992) was recently 
estimated as a SPSC model by Hartarska et al. (2010, 2011). In the model, the functional 
form restrictions on G(ln r) are relaxed while retaining the general quadratic relationship 
between outputs and input prices apparent in F(q, ln r). This approach affords the 
researcher sufficient flexibility to model costs and investigate scope economies without 
concern that tenuous parametric specification issues are driving results. Moreover, 
Hartarska et al. (2011) document that the incorporation of environmental variables  
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is easily handled within the smooth coefficients and that additional structure of the 
underlying cost function can be discerned with relative ease in the SPSC model setting. 
To describe the process used to estimate our cost function via smooth coefficient 
estimation, we first introduce some basic concepts. Let the function G(ln r) be defined as 
exp(b0 + ∑bk ln rk + ∑∑bkl ln rk ln rl). Equation (3) can then be written as: 
0
1 ln ,
2i i ij i j ik i k
C a a q a q q g q r = + + +  ∑ ∑∑ ∑∑  (4) 
where āi, āij and gik are the coefficients аi, аij, and gik in equation (3) multiplied by G(ln r). 
Therefore, we can specify āij and gik as functions of ln r and an additional series  
of covariates that can be thought of as capturing the environment in which the MFI 
operates (Vi). 
We can write equation (2) in canonical SPSC form as:  
( ) ( )i i i i iy z z xα β ε= + +  (5) 
where yi = Ci, xi = [1 qi ′ qi ′qi qi ′ ln ri], zi = [ln ri Vi] and where qi represents the vector of 
outputs for the ith firm, ri is the vector of input prices and Vi contains our environmental 
variables.4 The SPSC model can be specified as quadratic in output, as recommended by 
Baumol et al. (1982), but given the lack of specification of β(zi) and α(zi) can be more or 
less general in input prices. 
Both Li et al. (2002) and Li and Racine (2010) propose an estimation procedure  
for the SPSC defined in equation (5). To implement their procedure, first, denote 
δ(zi) = [α(zi), β(zi)] and rewrite equation (5) as yi = δ(zi)Xi + ei, where Xi = [1 xi].  
The LCLS estimator of δ(z) becomes 
1( ) ( ( ) ) ( )z z z yδ −′ ′= X K X X K  (6) 
where K(z) is a diagonal matrix with ith element Ki = Kh(zi, z), constructed using the 
generalised product kernel of Racine and Li (2004) (see also Li and Racine, 2007),  
h is a vector of bandwidths and X is our matrix composed of Xi. The bandwidth vector 
determines the influence that ‘nearby’ observations have on the construction of δ(z). 
Nearby here is measured relative to z. Points further from z receive less weight and points 
closer, more weight. The notion of further and closer is determined by the bandwidth.  
We use a generalised kernel due to the fact that several of our environmental variables 
are discrete. 
Having the ability to introduce environmental variables in a manner that imposes as 
little structure as possible on the cost function is a desirable feature of the SPSC model in 
general. The elegance of the SPSC model is the simple intuition that it affords to the 
researcher. If the variables which appear in the smooth coefficients are fixed, then the 
model ‘becomes’ a traditional parametric model. Thus, we can think of the SPSC model 
as a ‘conditional’ parametric model. A key benefit of this is that interpreting results 
becomes easier: if we ‘fix’ the variables inside the smooth coefficients, then this is just a 
linear in parameters quadratic cost function. The key feature to grasp is that the cost 
functions shape changes as the variables that enter the smooth coefficient change, thus 
allowing additional flexibility beyond any given parametric specification. 
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The selection of the smoothing parameters is commonly perceived as the most 
important issue when estimating the SPSC. An array of alternatives exist to construct 
bandwidths. For our purposes we use Least-Squares Cross-Validation (LSCV), which  
Li and Racine (2010) show produces bandwidths which perform well in small sample 
settings similar to our empirical setup. LSCV bandwidth selection determines bandwidths 
by minimising the squared distance between the observed outcomes (MFI costs) and the 
leave-one-out estimate of cost. Numerically, the criterion appears as: 
1 2
0
ˆLSCV( ) min ( ) ,
n
i ih i
h n C C−
−
=
= −∑  (7) 
where ˆ iC−  is the leave-one-out estimator of cost for the ith MFI that is produced by 
dropping the ith MFI (observation) from our construction of costs in equation (5). 
Essentially, LSCV selects bandwidths that result in the best fitting cost function  
at each data point, without using that specific data point in the construction of the cost 
function. This form of bandwidth selection is common in applied work with numerous 
covariates. The use of a leave-one-observation out approach avoids the pathological case 
of interpolation of the data by setting all bandwidths to zero. 
3.3 Scope economies and board size and composition 
After estimating scope economies from a cost function that also includes environmental 
variables, we look for statistically significant differences across several groups using a 
simple means test. We are interested in differences in board size and composition 
between MFIs with estimated scope economies and/or diseconomies, and between MFIs 
offering savings and loans and MFIs lending only. We create a dummy variable taking 
the value of one if the MFI has estimated positive scope economies and 0 if it has 
negative scope economies and regress it on variables measuring board size and 
composition, namely the presence of each type of stakeholders described in the literature 
review as well as on the proportion of these stakeholders on the board. This model offers 
insights on the impact of governance mechanisms in MFIs which should lend and collect 
deposits rather than only lend. To gain insight on the link of governance and the overall 
















+ + +∑ ∑  (8) 
where the controls included MFI age and size, as we expect that learning occurs over the 
life of the MFI and that, with the passage of time, managers gain experience within both 
the institution and the environmental setting (Caudill et al., 2009). MFI age is measured 
in years from the start of microfinance activity, MFI size is measured as the log of the 
total assets. 
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4 Data 
The dataset was constructed from publicly available data (from www.ratingfund2.org and 
several other sources) and consists of all available risk assessment reports conducted by 
five major rating agencies (MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, Crisil, and M-Cril), 
as of June 2007. To date, the dataset analysed here remains the highest-quality, publicly 
available cross-country data for MFIs worldwide which not only contains up to four years 
of financial data necessary to estimate scope economies but also data for various 
governance mechanisms including the board of directors. The rating reports in the 
database are from 2000 to 2007, with the majority coming from the last four years. 
The final dataset analysed here consists of MFIs from approximately  
35–40 developing countries. While the main database is large, not all MFIs  
have complete information that can be used to estimate scope economies, and since not 
all of them provide detailed information on their governance, the data used consist of 
between 350–450 annual observations from 90 MFIs to 160 MFIs depending on the 
model specification. 
In the cost function, the dependent variable is the total costs, which are the sum of 
operating and financial costs, input prices are the annual labour cost per worker, cost  
of financial capital, measured by the cost of all borrowed funds to their stock, and the 
cost of physical capital, measured as the ratio of non-labour operating expense to fixed 
assets. The vector of environmental variables includes the depth of financial market 
development in the country, population density, percent rural population, MFI lending 
type, the region it operates in and the year of operation. 
Governance variables are Board size, measured by the number of board members, and 
the square term is also calculated and included to capture the possible non-linear impact 
of this variable. Other internal governance variables include dummies for the presence of 
clients, employees, donors, creditors, and women on the board as well as women-CEOs 
and Chairwomen. In addition, variables measuring the proportion of clients, employees, 
donors, and debt holders on the board are also used in alternative regressions.  
The average board in the sample consists of seven members that meet about nine 
times a year (see Table 1). Stakeholder groups are included as members, but in small 
numbers only. For example, only 6% of boards have employee representation and 2% 
have creditor representation; 10% and 12% have donor and client representation, 
respectively. This ex-ante knowledge indicates that stakeholder representation is not very 
common in MFI boards, but this representation has been recommended, and it is 
important to find out if the results show links between stakeholders representation  
and scope economies. Finally, in 10% of the data, the CEO is also the chairman of  
the board, indicating that there may be a reasonable separation of management and 
control (Table 1). 
5 Results 
For the sample analysed here, results from the first stage semi-parametric smooth 
coefficient model show overall scope economies of 13% similar to scope economies 
estimates for the larger samples (Hartarska et al., 2010, 2011). When the results are 
broken down by MFIs offering lending and savings and lending only, we see substantial 
differences, again consistent with results from larger samples. Deposit collecting  
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MFIs have negligible economies of scope of about 1%, depending on the sample used, 
while the potential scope economies for lending-only MFIs are much larger, about 16% 
(Table 2). 
Table 1 Summary statistics of governance related data 
Variable Obs. Mean St. dev. Min Max 
Board size  
(number of members) 
556 7.1 3.9 2 33 
CEO is Chair of the board  
(dummy =1 if CEO is Chair,–0 otherwise) 
501 12% 0.309 0 100% 
Female CEO  
(dummy=1 if CEO is female, zero otherwise) 
499 26.9% 44.4% 0 100% 
Female Chairwoman  
(dummy=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
403 24.3% 43.0% 0 100% 
Dummy Donors Represented  
(dummy=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
453 9.1% 28.7% 0 100% 
Dummy International Representatives  
dummy = 1 if yes, zero otherwise) 
457 21.2% 40.9% 0 100% 
Dummy Employee Representatives  
(dummy = 1 if yes, zero otherwise)  
450 5.6% 22.9% 0 100% 
Dummy Clients–Representatives  
(dummy = 1 if yes, zero otherwise) 
452 11.9% 32.5% 0 100% 
Dummy Creditors–Represented  450 1.8% 13.2% 0 100% 
Dummy Female Board Members  
(dummy = 1 if yes, zero otherwise) 
306 77.1% 42.1% 0 100% 
Donor representatives on the board (%) 453 5.8 20.4 0 100 
International board members on the board (%) 457 9.2 21.6 0 100 
Employee representatives on the board (%) 450 4.0 18.8 0 100 
Client representatives on the board (%) 452 10.9 30.8 0 100 
Creditor representatives on the board (%) 450 0.9 8.5 0 100 
Female board members on the board (%) 306 28.4 25.1 0 100 
Table 2 Scope economies by lending only and lending and collecting savings (% of sample) 
 Savings and loans MFIs Loans–only MFIs 
Overall scope economies (%) 1 16 
Scope economies (%) 20 25 
Scope diseconomies (%) –28 –14 
When we split MFIs by lending only and lending and deposit mobilisation we see that 
similar magnitudes in (positive) scope economies: 20% for savings and loans and 25% 
for lending-only MFIs. Within the group of MFIs with scope diseconomies, we find twice 
larger scope diseconomies of 28% for savings and lending MFIs compared to scope 
diseconomies of 14% for lending-only MFIs. Further, we find that, within the MFIs  
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collecting deposits, half have scope economies and half have scope diseconomies while, 
within the group of lending-only MFIs, 77% could have scope economies if they were to 
collect savings and 23% could have scope diseconomies. The differences across these 
groups are statistically significant. 
Table 3 presents the differences in governance characteristics between MFIs with 
scope economies and with scope diseconomies. The governance characteristics explored 
are board size, and composition both in terms of whether a group is represented on the 
board and the proportion of the board that the group’s representatives constitute. This is 
done because studies have shown that the presence of a group and that group’s relative 
proportion affect the decision making process differently (Konrad et al., 2008). 
Table 3 Board characteristics by MFIs with scope economies and MFIs with scope 
diseconomies 
Variables Scope diseconomies Scope economies 
Board size (members) 7.8 6.8*** 
CEO is Chair of the board 18 10* 
Female Chairwoman  31 23 
Female CEO 25 20 
 Dummy donors represented 9 9 
Proportion of board members that are donors 6 7 
 Dummy international representatives 19 22 
Proportion of international board members 7 10 
 Dummy employee represented 3 6 
Proportion board members that are employees 3 5 
 Dummy clients represented 21 8** 
Proportion board members that are clients  21 7*** 
 Dummy creditors represented 2 1 
Proportion board members that are creditors 2 0.3** 
 Dummy women represented 77 77 
Proportion of female board members 33 27* 
Total number of observations 121 246 
*Mean difference is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
**Mean difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
***Mean difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Results show that there are various degrees of differences in governance mechanisms  
by MFIs with scope economies and diseconomies. For example, MFIs with scope 
economies have statistically significant (at least on the 10% level) smaller boards 
(average of 6.8 compared to 7.8 members), fewer women chair their boards (10% vs. 
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MFIs with scope economies have a smaller proportion of women on the board: 27% on 
average.5 Further, compared to MFIs with scope diseconomies, fewer MFIs with scope 
economies have clients on the board (8% vs. 21%) and a smaller proportion of their board 
members consists of creditors (0.3% vs. 2%). The composition of the board does not 
show statistically significant differences according to other characteristics. 
Table 4 shows differences in the governance characteristics of MFIs who actually 
offer savings and those that only lend. The statistically significant differences here are 
also in terms of board size with lending only MFIs having fewer members (7.1 vs. 7.9) 
and much fewer MFIs with client representatives: 3% of lending-only MFIs vs. 32% in 
MFIs collecting savings. However, many more lending-only MFIs have donor 
representatives on their boards (12% vs. 5%) and in larger proportion (8% vs. 4%) as 
well as more international board members (29% vs. 18% for the savings collecting MFIs) 
reflecting MFIs’ funding source preferences and the need of donors to control the  
MFIs better. 
Table 4 Board characteristics by MFIs offering savings and loans and lending only 
Variables Savings and loans Lending only  
Board size (members) 7.9*** 7.1 
CEO is Chair of the board 10 20 
Female Chairwoman  20 20 
Female CEO 20 20 
 Dummy donors represented 5** 12 
Proportion of board members that are donors 4** 8 
 Dummy international representatives 18*** 29 
Proportion of international board members 9 12 
 Dummy employee represented 9 7 
Proportion board members that are employees 6 5 
 Dummy clients represented 32*** 3 
Proportion board members that are clients  31** 2 
 Dummy creditors represented 3 2 
Proportion board members that are creditors 1 1 
 Dummy women represented 71 77 
Proportion of female board members 30 27 
Total number of observations 92 275 
*Mean difference is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
**Mean difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
***Mean difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Table 5 presents results from a panel probit model which aims to determine what board 
size and composition are associated with (positive) scope economies. Several models are 
presented because data for each type of board composition are represented by various  
sample sizes. Limited data are available for women representatives on the board in  
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general, as well as whether they serve as CEOs and chairwomen. In addition, fewer MFIs 
have data on whether creditors are represented on their boards. Therefore, three  
to five specifications with various sample sizes are estimated. Panel A represents the 
results across various board types in terms of whether they have some type of board 
representatives while Panel B represents results from regressions of the proportion of 
representatives on the board. In terms of board size, our results are consistent with 
Hartarska and Mersland (2012) who find non-linear board size impact on outreach 
efficiency with an optimal board size of about nine members. 
Table 5 Panel probit regression of probability of positive scope economies on various 
governance characteristics 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A    
MFI size (total assets $) –0.283 –0.263 –0.137 
 (0.22) (0.219) (0.292) 
MFI age (in years) –0.243*** –0.248*** –0.280*** 
 (0.0581) (0.0591) (0.076) 
CEO is Chair of the board –2.244*** –2.160** –2.576** 
 (0.855) (0.85) (1.048) 
Board size (members) –0.692* –0.723* –0.843 
 (0.366) (0.369) (0.604) 
Board size (members)2 0.0394** 0.0409** 0.0566 
 (0.0199) (0.0201) (0.0378) 
 Dummy donors represented  0.299 0.256 0.897 
 (0.962) (0.956) (1.314) 
 Dummy international representatives –1.118 –1.163 –2.247** 
 (0.746) (0.746) (0.975) 
 Dummy employees representatives 2.036* 2.088* 1.912 
 (1.219) (1.201) (1.592) 
 Dummy client representatives –1.145 –1.174 –2.661** 
 (0.896) (0.892) (1.239) 
 Dummy creditor representatives  –1.809  
  (1.808)  
Female CEO   0.534 
   (0.85) 
Female Chairwoman   –1.326 
   (0.885) 
Constant 10.87*** 10.78*** 9.871** 
 (3.615) (3.604) (4.864) 
Observations 367 367 279 
Number of MFIs  120 120 93 
Chi2 73.62 72.43 63.04 
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Governance and scope economies in Microfinance Institutions 89    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Table 5 Panel probit regression of probability of positive scope economies on various 
governance characteristics (continued) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Panel B    
MFI size (total assets $) –0.334 –0.312 –0.226 
 (0.219) –0.214 –0.293 
MFI age (in years) –0.231*** –0.239*** –0.266*** 
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.075) 
CEO is Chair of the board –1.926** –1.560* –2.126** 
 (0.829) (0.809) (1.025) 
Board size (members) –0.679* –0.809** –0.774 
 (0.367) (0.379) (0.662) 
Board size (members)2 0.0389* 0.0452** 0.0517 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.042) 
1.254 1.153 1.369 Proportion of board members that are 
donors (1.636) (1.608) (2.270) 
Proportion of international board members  –1.354 –1.435 –2.347 
 (1.438) (1.425) (1.830) 
1.698 1.781 0.807 Proportion of board members that are 
employees (1.540) (1.515) (2.070) 
–1.278 –1.214 –3.046** Proportion of board members that are 
clients (0.937) (0.910) (1.375) 
Female CEO   0.557 
   (0.881) 
Female Chairwoman   –1.356 
   (0.897) 
 –6.079*  Proportion of board members that are 
creditors  (3.219)  
Constant 11.33*** 11.59*** 10.64** 
 (3.610) (3.630) (4.910) 
Annual observations 367 367 279 
Number of MFIs  120 120 93 
Chi2 74.56 68.98 64.07 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
The results on CEO-Chairperson duality are also consistent with previous work and show 
that scope economies are more than half as likely in MFIs where the CEO is also chairing 
the board (P-value < 0.01 in M1, M2 and M3, Table 5(A)). However, scope economies 
are nearly twice as likely in MFIs that have employees (other than the CEOs) represented  
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on the board (P-value < 0.10 in Models 1 and 2, Table 5(B)). The magnitude of the 
negative effect of the CEO-Chairperson dummy on the probability of scope economies is  
larger than the positive effect of having employees on the board. However, higher 
proportion of employees on the board does not affect the probability of (positive) scope 
economies as the results in Table 5 Panel B show positive but not statistically significant 
association, while the negative impact of the dual position remains. 
MFIs with international directors on the board are twice less likely to have  
scope economies (twice as likely to have diseconomies of scope, P-value < 0.05  
Model (2, Table 5(A)); however, the variable measuring the proportion of international 
directors on the board is positive but not statistically significant. Similarly, MFIs with 
clients on the board are more than twice more likely to have scope diseconomies – each 
additional percent change in the proportion of clients increased the probability  
of scope diseconomies three times – which is a very large magnitude probably  
due to the very small number of MFIs with client representation on the board  
(P-value < 0.05). The marginal impact of the proportion of creditors on the board is  
even higher at –6.08 per unit of change (P-value < 0.10), presumably because creditors 
are also rarely represented on the board usually when the MFI is experiencing problems. 
It is very important to note, however, that these results are not statistically significant  
for each of the regressions, suggesting that sample composition may be an issue,  
and suggesting that a larger dataset may be required to confirm or reject these results in 
the future. 
Table 6, Panels A and B, present panel random effect regression of actual scope 
economies and diseconomies on board size and composition. There are a few similarities 
with the results of the panel probit regression of positive scope economies. In two of the 
samples, the coefficient on the dummy for employee representation on the MFI’s board is 
positive and statistically significant(P-value < 0.05 in M5, P-value < 0.1 in M4,  
Table 6(A)), suggesting that MFIs with employees on the board have on average  
27–30% higher scope economies compared to those without employees on the board. 
Similarly, the proportion of board members who are employees also influences the value 
of scope economies. For the average board with about one client on the board, adding one 
more employee (11% change due to one more employee on the board) is associated with 
three times higher percentage point of scope economies (0.276 × 11 or 0.302 × 11,  
with P-value < 0.1 and P-value < 0.05, respectively, according to Models 4 and 5  
in Table 6(A)). 
We further find that, while the presence of women, clients, and creditors on the  
board does not have statistically significant impact on scope economies, the proportion  
of these on the board does (Table 6 Panel B). In particular, an MFI with a board with  
one more woman (3 instead of the average 2) is associated with a 3% point  
(P-value < 0.1) lower estimate of scope economies (or larger scope diseconomies).  
It is again important to note that these results are not robust to alternative specifications 
and thus they cannot be taken in isolation. For example, the replacement of one board 
member to increase the proportion of a stakeholder group likely decreases the proportion 
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The results for the scope economies regressions in Table 6, Panels A and B, do not 
show statistically significant associations between scope economies and board size  
and the CEO-Chair duality. However, the inverse relationship between the control 
variables of MFI age and scope economies is preserved: an additional year of existence is 
associated with one percent point lower scope economies. 
Table 6 A random effects regression of scope economies on governance characteristics 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A      
MFI size (total assets $) –0.10*** –0.10*** –0.10*** –0.11*** –0.11*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) 
MFI age (in years) –0.012*** –0.012*** –0.009* –0.008 –0.007 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
0.00524 0.0119 0.0692 –0.0499 –0.122 CEO is Chair of the board 
(0.088) (0.088) (0.096) (0.130) (0.123) 
Board size (members) –0.0176 –0.0212 0.00786 –0.0263 –0.016 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.042) (0.057) (0.057) 
0.00134 0.00149 0.00035 0.00192 0.0014 Board size (members)2 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
–0.00772 –0.0172 0.0161 –0.0152 –0.0121  Dummy donor represented 
(0.100) (0.100) (0.118) (0.113) (0.114) 
–0.0104 –0.0191 –0.0154 –0.00848 –0.0088  Dummy international 
representatives (0.074) (0.073) (0.085) (0.085) (0.086) 
0.142 0.166 0.137 0.276* 0.302**  Dummy employees 
represented (0.113) (0.113) (0.126) (0.150) (0.151) 
–0.0932 –0.0984 –0.147 –0.114 –0.129  Dummy client represented 
(0.089) (0.089) (0.109) (0.112) (0.113) 
 –0.268  –0.504   Dummy creditor represented 
 (0.180)  (0.312)  
Female CEO   0.0424 0.0855 0.0883 
   (0.077) (0.080) (0.081) 
   –0.0728 0.003 0.005 
   (0.080) (0.082) (0.083) 
   –0.136 –0.107  Dummy women represented 
   (0.091) (0.090) 
Constant 1.781*** 1.772*** 1.575*** 1.907*** 1.875*** 
 (0.299) (0.297) (0.357) (0.398) (0.401) 
Observations 367 367 279 217 217 
Number of MFIs  120 120 93 73 73 
R2  0.113 0.122 0.124 0.213 0.188 
Chi2 53.06 55.29 39.58 46.54 43.62 
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Table 6 A random effects regression of scope economies on governance characteristics 
(continued) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel B      
MFI size (total assets $) –0.101*** –0.099*** –0.098*** –0.096*** –0.117*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.022) (0.027) 
MFI age (in years) –0.011*** –0.012*** –0.00695 –0.00818 –0.00473 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
CEO–Chair 0.0161 0.0486 0.0833 0.12 –0.087 
 (0.086) (0.087) (0.092) (0.093) (0.122) 
Board size (members) –0.0128 –0.0232 0.0184 0.00207 –0.00538 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.042) (0.042) (0.057) 
Board size (members)2 0.00109 0.00156 –0.00061 0.000124 0.000497 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
0.0229 0.0144 0.0421 0.0269 0.0328 Proportion of board members 
that are donors (0.153) (0.151) (0.196) (0.193) (0.189) 
0.0152 0.00236 0.046 0.0259 0.0558 Proportion of international 
board members  (0.137) (0.136) (0.162) (0.160) (0.158) 
0.228 0.23 0.264 0.263 0.403** Proportion of board members 
that are employees (0.147) (0.145) (0.172) (0.169) (0.182) 
–0.108 –0.105 –0.192* –0.18 –0.138 Proportion of board members 
that are clients (0.094) (0.093) (0.116) (0.115) (0.123) 
 –0.563*  –0.606**  Proportion of board members 
that are creditors  (0.288)  (0.297)  
    –0.267* Proportion of women board 
members      (0.147) 
Female CEO   0.0412 0.0434 0.122 
   (0.0763) (0.075) (0.082) 
Female Chairwoman   –0.0749 –0.08 0.0214 
   (0.078) (0.076) (0.084) 
Constant 1.766*** 1.788*** 1.543*** 1.600*** 1.914*** 
 (0.296) (0.294) (0.348) (0.346) (0.391) 
Observations 367 367 279 279 217 
Number of MFIs  120 120 93 93 73 
R2 0.121 0.142 0.147 0.175 0.208 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
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6 Conclusions 
Stakeholders of MFIs encourage lending-only institutions to lower costs by becoming 
deposit-mobilising institutions. We are the first to identify which governance 
mechanisms are associated with MFIs with scope economies (lower costs) from jointly 
lending and collecting savings. This work brings together two lines of research. The first 
deals with obtaining the best estimates of the magnitudes of costs savings from providing 
both savings and loans as opposed to lending-only. The second line of research explores 
associations between various MFI efficiency measures such as the estimated scope 
economies and various internal mechanisms of control. 
We estimate the magnitudes of scope economies with a semi-parametric smooth 
coefficient function that was recently proposed as a better methodology for analysing our 
data and accounts for various environmental factors outside of the control of MFIs 
governance mechanisms. These factors are the depth of financial markets development in 
the country, population density, percentage of rural population, MFI lending type, region 
it operates in, and year of operation. We find that, on average, MFIs have positive scope 
economies of 13% but that there are significant differences in estimated scope economies 
by MFI types – those offering savings products and those that only lend. 
The results on the links between board size and composition and the estimated scope 
economies are interesting. We first find a non-linear relationship between board size and 
the probability that the MFI has positive scope economies, and estimate that the optimal 
board size is about nine members, consistent with the findings of Hartarska and Mersland 
(2012) who find that scale efficiency improves with up to nine board members. We find  
that the (probability of positive) scope economies are positively associated with the 
presence MFI employees but negatively associated with CEO board Chairperson duality. 
The magnitude of the latter impact is larger than the positive impact of employees on the 
board. Consistent with these findings are the results that board diversity measured by  
the presence of women and international directors, as well as the presence of various 
stakeholders on the board, are associated with smaller scope economies and inversely 
related to the probability of positive scope economies. These results seem to support the 
notion that, in high risk environments, employees’ (but not CEOs’) insider information, 
presumably about the preferences and incentives of savers and borrowers, translates into 
better decisions that bring cost savings. 
The findings add to previous research which shows that overall cost economies are 
realised due to shared infrastructure (large fixed costs) and not from learning from one 
group (e.g., borrowers) that can be used in serving another group of clients (e.g., savers), 
likely because borrowers and savers are different groups (Hartarska et al., 2011). We find 
that, given these particularities, the information employees on the board bring may be 
helpful in improving decision making which could translate into cost savings. Given the 
limitations of the dataset, it is expected that further data collection and analysis with 
larger datasets could bring about better understanding of how governance affects 
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Notes 
1Hartarska and Mersland (2012) summarize the theoretical contributions that have motivated the 
empirical microfinance governance literature. 
2Some authors have argued that with endogenously chosen boards, differences in performance may 
be attributed to specification issues (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). However, a study by Cornett 
and Tehranian (2008) shows that if a firm’s performance is adjusted for earning management, the 
measured importance of governance variables increases and the impact of incentive-based 
compensation on corporate performance decreases; thus, the presence of independent outside 
directors, the institutional ownership of shares, and representation on the board of directors can 
have a direct impact on performance. 
3Vieito (2012), summarises the tournament and behavioural theories’ implications for CEO gender 
related differences and company performance.  
4The environmental variables we include are depth of financial markets development in the 
country, the population density,–percent of rural population, MFI lending type, region it operates 
in and year of operation. 
5P-value of all comparisons is at least 0.10, typically >0.05. 
